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cause upon the grounds and for the reasons that the Court 
erred in the following particulars: 
1. That the statement of the purposes of the action as 
set out in the opinion is inaccurate, in that, plaintiff seeks to 
secure a judgment granting him the following relief: 
(a) That the purported bid of the Chamber of Commerce 
made for the purchase of the property at First South and State 
Streets be declared null and void; 
(b) That the acceptance of said purported bid be de-
clared null and void; 
(c) That Salt Lake City be enjoined from entering into 
a contract whereby it agrees to convey the above described 
tract of land to the Salt Lake City Chamber of Commerce, or 
to the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, or to Zions Securities Corporation; 
(d) That defendant, Salt Lake City and its Commission-
ers, be enjoined from conveying the City property above de-
scribed to anyone until it has provided facilities for its officers 
and employees while engaged in the governmental function 
of the City; 
(e) That neither defendant, Zions Securities Corporation, 
nor defendant Corporation of the President of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, may purchase a site for the 
erection of a Federal Building, nor use any of their assets in 
payment of the purchase price thereof. 
(f) Plaintiff also prays for general relief. 
2. That the Court erred in stating that the Salt Lake City 
Chamber of Commerce, and persons representing the interests 
2 
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of the Church, were desirous of cooperating with the Federal 
Government to obtain a suitable site for the building in down-
town Salt Lake City rather than for it to build on land wholly 
owned by the Government on the Fort Douglas Military Reser-
vation at the eastern outskirts of the City. 
The pleadings show that Mr. Backman, while representing 
the Church, solicited the United States Government to purchase 
the property at First South and State Streets. There is nothing 
in the pleadings from which it may be concluded that the 
United States owned any land on the Fort Douglas Reservation 
on which it intended to construct a Federal Building. 
3. That the Court erred in stating that the agreement to 
purchase the Lafayette School site was held in abeyance, and 
that it was decided it would be better to locate the new Federal 
Building on property owned by the City. It is alleged in the 
Complaint that the Lafayette School site was conveyed to 
Zions Securities Corporation prior to the time this action was 
commenced and that said Zions Securities Corporation con-
tinues to be the owner thereof for the purpose of erecting 
thereon a Federal Building. 
4. That the Court erred in confirming its opinion as to the 
grounds upon which plaintiff attacked the transaction to A, 
B, C and D mentioned on page 2 of the opinion, and in failing 
to state that plaintiff attacked the transaction upon the ground 
that such sale, if carried out, was contrary to and in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States, and of Section 22 of Article I of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, which provides that private property shall not 
be taken or damaged for a public use without just compensa-
tion. 
3 
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5. The Court erred in stating that plaintiff did not desig-
nate the purposes for which his donation to the Church was 
given, and that, therefore, such donor has no right to direct 
the manner in which the money so given shall be used merely 
because he has made such contribution to the Church, or because 
he is a member of a class which may be benefitted by the 
carrying out of its purposes. That this is in accord with the 
majority of the authorities. 
6. That the Court erred in stating that there is no doubt 
that the Church can legally purchase and sell property as any 
other property owner, and it can use any legitimate means to 
persuade a buyer to purchase from it, in that, while the Church 
can sell property, there is no authority conferred upon the 
Church is dispose of the property which it holds in trust for 
the purpose of constructing a Federal Building, and the sale 
here questioned is contrary to the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 
16-7-6. 
7. The Court erred in holding that no matter how great 
the benefit to be derived, or the detriment to be suffered by 
the Church in this transaction, neither would redound to the 
benefit or detriment of the commissioners as individuals, and 
further finding that: 
"Thus the 'conflict of interest' reasons for borbid-
ding contracts between the city and officials interested 
in the subject matter does not exist here because it is 
uniformly held that the 'interest' referred to in such 
a statute means that the official must have a 'personal 
and pecuniary interest' in the subject matter." 
8. The Court erred in stating that: 
"To assume that they (the commissioners) would 
4 
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betray their public trust and subvert the interests of the 
City to those of the Church would require the conjec-
ture that they are bent on wrongdoing and violating 
their oaths of office. Such conjecture the law will not 
indulge, but in the absence of a specific charge to the 
contrary, right conduct is always presumed." 
In such particular the Court in assuming that to hold the City 
Commissioners were not disqualified from participating in 
the transaction involved in this action unless they were guilty 
of wrongdoing is contrary to the law applicable in such cases, 
in that, the good or bad intentions of the City Commissioners 
is immaterial. The statute makes them disqualified because of 
the relation that exists between them and the party with whom 
the contract is being made. 
9. The Court erred in holding that the conflict of interest 
reason for forbidding contracts between the City and officials 
interested in the subject matter does not exist here because it 
is uniformly held that the interest referred to in such statute 
means that the officers must have a personal and pecuniary 
interest in the subject matter. (As we read them the cited 
authorities do not so hold.) 
10. The Court erred in concluding that the application 
of the extension of the Rule again conflict of interest applied 
to the circumstances here shown would go far beyond the evils 
against which it is directed, and would likely create evils of its 
own. 
11. The Court erred in concluding that membership in 
the Church under the circumstances presented here does not 
fall within and as being prohibited by Section 10-6-38, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
5 
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12. The Court erred in holding that the provisions of 
Section 10-8-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, does not apply 
to a sale of the property here involved. 
13. The Court erred in concluding that there is no allega-
tion that there was any impropriety in the manner in which 
the City property was sold. 
Burton W. Musser 
Elias Hansen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant, 
721-26 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
We, the undersigned, Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appel-
lant, hereby certify that in our opinion there is merit to the 
aforegoing Petition for Rehearing, and that in order to do 
justice to the parties a rehearing should be granted, and the 
errors complained of corrected. 
Burton W. Musser 
Elias Hansen 
ARGUMENT 
It may be that some of the alleged errors claimed by 
Appellant to have been committed by the Court in the opinion 
6 
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heretofore written are not of controlling importance, but we 
assume that if the errors complained of are meritorious, the 
Court will welcome that the same be called to its attention 
so that the same be corrected before they become the established 
law in this jurisdiction. 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS STATEMENTS OF THE 
PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE CITY UNDERTOOK TO 
SELL ITS PROPERTY AT FIRST SOUTH AND STATE 
STREETS, IN THAT THE ONLY BID IT HAD WAS BY 
THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY 
WHICH CONTAINED A PROVISION THAT THE CITY 
COULD CONVEY THE PROPERTY TO WHOMSOEVER 
IT MIGHT DESIGNATE; THAT IF AND WHEN THE 
PROPERTY WAS CONVEYED TO THE CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE IT PLANNED TO CONVEY THE PROP-
ERTY TO THE DEFENDANT, ZIONS SECURITIES COR-
PORATION, WHICH IN TURN PLANNED TO CONVEX 
THE PROPERTY TO THE UNITED STATES. 
It is, of course, the established law that if there is such a 
defect in the chain of title to real property so that the title 
sought to be conveyed fails to pass from a grantor to a grantee 
in chain of title, the ultimate grantee does not acquire title. 
Thus, if the City is without authority to convey its property to 
the Chamber of Commerce, and the Chamber of Commerce is 
without authority to convey the property to Zions Securities 
Corporation, or Zions Securities Corporation is without author-
ity to convey the property to the United States, then and under 
7 
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such a state of facts the United States will not acquire title 
to the property. Thus, if the City was without authority to 
convey the property, the title thereto remains in the City. We 
have alleged facts which we claim are fatally defective in 
passing title by the various conveyances, and if the alleged 
facts are established, Appellant is entitled to prevail. We 
shall discuss the legal effect of the various alleged defects 
later in this Brief. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE SALT 
LAKE CITY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND PERSONS 
REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE CHURCH 
WERE DESIROUS OF COOPERATING WITH THE FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN A SUITABLE SITE 
FOR THE BUILDING IN DOWNTOWN SALT LAKE 
CITY RATHER THAN FOR IT TO BUILD ON LAND 
WHOLLY OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT ON THE 
FORT DOUGLAS MILITARY RESERVATION AT THE 
EASTERN OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY. 
It has been established law in this and other jurisdictions 
generally that when an attack is made upon the sufficiency of 
a complaint to state a cause of action, the court in passing 
upon such an attack is confined to the facts alleged in the 
complaint. It is alleged upon information and belief in para-
graph 16 of the complaint that the bid made by Gus P. Backman 
was so made at the solicitation of defendant, Corporation of 
the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
and its agent and owned defendant, Zions Securities Corpo-
8 
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ration. There is nothing alleged in the complaint to the effect 
that the United States owned any land on the Fort Douglas 
Military Reservation upon which it intended to construct a 
Federal Building. There is an allegation in the complaint 
that defendant, Zion's Securities Corporation, acquired title 
to the Lafayette School site for the purpose of having the same 
conveyed to the United States for the purpose of having erected 
thereon a Federal Building. 
While we are not clear just what bearing some of the 
matters discussed under this Point has upon the conclusions 
reached by the Court, we assume the Court will joint with us in 
an effort to have the opinion reflect the facts alleged in the 
Complaint. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE 
AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE THE LAFAYETTE SCHOOL 
SITE WAS HELD IN ABEYANCE, AND THAT IT WAS 
DECIDED IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LOCATE THE 
NEW FEDERAL BUILDING ON PROPERTY OWNED BY 
THE CITY. 
It is alleged in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the Complaint 
that the Board of Education of Salt Lake City granted an option 
to defendant, Zions Securities Corporation, to purchase the 
Lafayette School site for $750,000.00 for the purpose of erect-
ing thereon a Federal Building, that notwithstanding a Lis 
Pendens was filed Zions Securities Corporation exercised the 
Option, and is holding the title thereto with the apparent 
purpose of erecting thereon a Federal Building. It is alleged 
9 
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in subsection paragraph 20(a) of the Complaint that only one 
Federal Building is planned to be constructed in Salt Lake 
City at this time, and that by reason of such fact Zions Securi-
ties Corporation is estopped from securing an additional site 
for such purpose. 
It may well be that neither the plaintiff nor the Fausetts 
have sufficient ground for complaint, if as stated in the opinion, 
the transaction touching the purchase of the Lafayette School 
site was held in abeyance, but when $750,000.00 of the Trust 
Fund held by the Corporation of the President and/or Zions 
Securities Corporation for the use and benefit of the members 
of the L.D.S. Church are used, to purchase a site for a Federal 
Building, an entirely different situation is presented. 
We shall have more to say about this phase of the case 
later in this Brief. We at this time again refer the Court to 
what is said and the authorities cited on page 50 of Appellant's 
original Brief. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PASS ON THE 
QUESTION RAISED IN PARAGRAPH 20(f) OF THE 
COMPLAINT WHEREIN IT IS ALLEGED THAT TO 
PERMIT THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE 
PRESIDENT AND/OR ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORA-
TION TO EXPEND FOR THE PURCHASE OF A SITE 
FOR A FEDERAL BUILDING SEVERAL HUNDRED 
THOUSAND DOLLARS OF THE TRUST FUND HELD 
BY THEM FOR THE BENEFITS OF THE MEMBERS OF 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
10 
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SAINTS WILL BE TO DEPRIVE THE BENEFICIARIES 
OF SUCH FUNDS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
AND WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION CONTRARY 
TO SECTION 22 OF ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF UTAH AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
"It is a fundamental principle of the constitutional 
system of government of the United States that the 
decisions of the Federal Supreme Court are final and 
authoritative declaration as to the proper and correct 
construction to be placed on the Constitution and laws 
of the United States, and as to whether a state law 
contravenes any provisions of the Federal Constitu-
tion." 11 Am. Jur. 740. 
In footnotes to the foregoing quotation will be found 
numerous cases of both federal and state courts of last resort 
where the law above quoted has been applied. Ever since the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
famous case of Dartmouth College v. Woodman, 4 Wheat 
(U.S.) 518, 4 L. Ed. 629, it has been held the established law 
uinformly adhered to that the legislative branch of government 
may not deprive one of a vested interest in property without 
due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. It is alleged in the 
Complaint that defendant Corporation of the President and/or 
defendant Zions Securities Corporation seek to expend several 
hundred thousand dollars of the money held by them for the 
benefit of the members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints for the purpose of paying for the purchase of a site 
for a Federal Building. In paragraph 7 of the Complaint the 
purposes or objects of defendant Corporation as stated in its 
11 
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Articles of Incorporation are to acquire, hold, dispose of 
such real and personal property as may be conveyed to acquire 
by said Corporation for the benefit of the members of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a religious society, 
for the benefit of religion, for works of charity and for public 
worship. 
The powers of defendant Corporation of the President, 
being a corporation sole, is thus defined in U.C.A. 1953, 
16-7-6, subsection ( l ) : 
'To acquire and possess, by donation, gift, bequest, 
devise or purchase, and to hold and maintain property, 
real, personal and mixed, and to grant, sell, convey, rent 
or otherwise dispose of the same as may be necessary 
to carry on or promote the objects of the corporation." 
To say that one of the objects of the Corporation of the 
President is the purchase of a site for a Federal Building is 
to stretch the language of such corporation and the provision 
of the statute above cited far beyond the breaking point. No 
less an authority than the Supreme Court of the United States 
has held that the funds held by the Church are trust funds 
which must be used for the benefit of its members and not 
otherwise. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1, 34 L. Ed. 481, 140 U.S. 665, 35 L. Ed. 592. 
It may or may not be that the funds which are to be used to 
assist in the purchase of a Federal Building are part of the 
funds involved in the foregoing decision. If such funds are 
the funds involved in the foregoing decision, the purpose for 
which the same may be used is res adjudicata, if not, the doc-
trine of stare decisis applies. In either event to hold that 
U.C.A. 1953, 16-7-6 empowers the Corporation of the President 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to use the trust funds held by it to assist in the purchase of 
a Federal Building constitutes a taking of the property of the 
beneficiaries of such trust fund in violation of the provisions 
of Section 22 of Article One of the Constitution of Utah, and 
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
In their respective briefs, the defendant corporation of 
the President (see its Brief page 36) and Zions Securities (see 
its Brief page 28) commit such defendants to the position that 
the giving of several hundred thousand dollars toward the 
purchase of a Federal Building is an act of charity. The 
opinion rejects such theory and bases its opinion on a strictly 
commercial basis, that is to say to advance the financial interests 
of the Corporation of the President and Zions Securities. The 
defendants do not make the claim that the money to be spent 
is for the purpose of aiding them financially and if that is 
the purpose, then under the circumstances alleged in the com-
plaint, such a purpose is condemned by law in that it is the 
duty of public officers to select a site for a public building 
at a place which best serves the public interest without being 
influenced by a purpose intended to serve special interests. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT PLAIN-
TIFF DID NOT DESIGNATE THE PURPOSES FOR 
WHICH HIS DONATION TO THE CHURCH WAS GIVEN 
AND THAT, THEREFORE, SUCH DONOR HAS NO 
RIGHT TO DIRECT THE MANNER IN WHICH THE 
MONEY SO GIVEN SHALL BE USED. 
13 
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While neither appellant, Jesse B. Stone, nor appellants 
Fausetts, allege in their pleadings that they placed any limi-
tation on the donation that they made to the Church, they do 
allege that they have an interest in the trust fund held by the 
Corporation of the President which is alleged to be the owner 
of the defendant Zions Securities Corporation, which being 
the allegations the court must assume the same as true. In 
light of the fact that the Corporation of the President, as 
stated in its Articles of Incorporation, will use the properly 
it might acquire for the benefit of the members of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a religious society, "for 
the benefit of religion, for works of charity and for public 
worship," nothing would be gained by the donor stating how 
the donation should be used. The trustee of the fund having 
stated the purposes for which the donation will be used, 
there would seem to be no escape from the conclusion that the 
property must be used for the stated purpose. Moreover, under 
the provisions of the statute, U.C.A. 1953, 16-7-1, and 16-7-6, 
property held by a corporation sole may lawfully be used only 
for "the benefit of religion, for works of charity and public 
worship." If the corporation sole uses the property held by it 
for any purpose other than that provided in its Articles and 
as provided by the law pursuant to which it is permitted to 
exist, such corporation not only fails to keep its promises to 
the donor, but also fails to keep within the powers conferred 
upon it by law. While a beneficiary may not direct how a trust 
fund shall be used by the trustee, he may prevent the trustee 
of the fund from disposing of the same in violation of the 
terms of the trust. In support of such view we direct the 
attention of the Court to some of the cases cited by Counsel 
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for the Corporation of the President, among which are the 
following: 
Nancy v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 18 S.W. 874, 15 
L.R.A. 801; 
Kittinger v. Churchill, 292 N.Y.S. 35; 
Skinner v. Holmes, 133 NJ . Eq.. 593, 33 A.(2d) 
819. 
See also brief of Zions Securities, pages 7 to 10. 
These cases do hold that one who ceases to be a member of 
a church may not be heard to complain as to the manner in 
which the church property is being used, but on the contrary 
a member of the church as a beneficiary may maintain an action 
to enjoin those who have control of the fund from using the 
same in a manner contrary to the purposes for which the fund 
is being held. Other authorities and cases of similar import 
are cited on page 48 of Appellant's original Brief. 
It may be that plaintiff Stone may not be heard to com-
plain if the fund is misused, but in its opinion the Court 
disposed of the case as if the Fausetts were parties to the 
action, and as such be heard to raise the question of the manner 
in which the Corporation of the President is using the trust 
fund. Indeed, if the beneficiaries of a fund may not maintain 
an action to prevent the misuse of a trust fund, it follows 
that the trustee may use such fund as meets its fancy. The 
Court cites the cases of Wemrne v. Noyes, (Ore.) 294 Pac. 602, 
incorrectly cited as being in 194 Pac; Clark v. Oliver, 91 
Va. 421, 22 S.E. 175; Restatement of Trusts, (2d) Sec. 391; 
Dickey v. Volker, 62 A.L.R. 858, erroneously cited as being 
in 11 S.W. (2d) 279- As we read these cases and authorities 
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they make against and not in support of the statement in the 
opinion. 
To understand the purport of the holdings in the case of 
Wemme v. Noyes, supra, it is necessary to read the other 
Oregon case therein cited where the same question was before 
the court. We especially direct the attention of the Court to 
the cases of Wemme v. First Church of Christ, 219 Pac. 618, 
and 237 Pac. 674. In these cases the distinction between 
Public and Private Trusts is discussed. It is held that in case 
of a Public Trust an action to enforce a compliance with its 
terms must be brought by the Attorney General, and in case 
of a Private Trust such an action must be brought by a bene-
ficiary of the trust. The trust here involved is, under all of the 
authorities as we read them, a private trust. It is no concern 
of the Attorney General how the Corporation of the President 
shall dispose of its funds, but it is of the concern of the bene-
ficiaries of such fund how the same shall be disposed of. 
To review the facts and the law in the other cases and 
authorities cited on page 3 under Note 2 of the opinion will 
unduly lengthen this Brief. We earnestly urge the Court to 
re-examine the question of right of a member of the L.D.S. 
Church to maintain this action, and having done so we believe 
the Court will not be able to escape the conclusion that the 
law there discussed applies to Public Trusts, and not to Private 
Trusts, and that a beneficiary of a Private Trust such as this 
may maintain an action to enjoin the trustee from disposing 
of the property held by him in a manner not provided by 
the terms of the trust and in accord with the law providing 
for the purposes for which such fund may be used. On page 
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48 of our original Brief will be found other authorities dealing 
with public and private trusts and by whom its terms may be 
enforced. 
POINT SIX 
THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THERE IS 
NO DOUBT THAT THE CHURCH CAN LEGALLY PUR-
CHASE AND SELL PROPERTY AS ANY OTHER PROP-
ERTY OWNER, AND IT CAN USE ANY LEGITIMATE 
MEANS TO PERSUADE A BUYER TO PURCHASE FROM 
IT. 
It has repeatedly been held by this Court that a corpo-
ration has such powers and only such powers as have been 
conferred upon it by law, which include such pov/ers as are 
necessary for the exercise of the powers conferred. 
Republic v. Price, 65 Utah 57, 234 Pac. 231. 
Wilde v. Emma Copper Co., 58 Utah 524, 200 Pac. 
517. 
The same is true of Municipal Corporations. 
American Fork City v. Robinson, 11 Utah 168, 292 
Pac. 249; 
Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 55, 48 Pac. 41; 
Salt Lake City v. Nutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 Pac. 234; 
Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 Pac. (2d) 
591. 
A corporation sole is a creature of statutory law the same as 
a corporation created for profit. The powers of a corporation 
sole are defined in U.C.A. 1953, 16-7-1. Thus a corporation 
sole may be formed for the purpose of acquiring, holding or 
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disposing of church or religious society property for "the 
benefit of religion, for works of charity and for public worship 
in the manner hereinafter provided." 
U.C.A. 1953, 16-7-6, provides that a corporation sole shall 
have power 
" (1) To acquire and possess, by donation gift, bequest, 
devise or purchase and to hold and maintain 
property, real, personal and mixed, and to grant, 
sell, convey, rent or otherwise dispose of the same 
as may be necessary to carry on or promote the 
objects of the corporation/' 
Thus, a corporation sole is limited to disposing of its property 
for the benefit of religion, for works of charity and for public 
worship. To say that the expenditure of several hundred 
thousand dollars of religious society property to induce the 
officers of the Federal Government to select a site for a Federal 
Building is neither a power conferred upon a corporation sole, 
nor is it necessary to so use its funds in order to exercise the 
conferred powers. In our somewhat extended research we have 
been unable to find any adjudicated case or other authority 
so holding. The law announced in the cases of Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, supra, is to the 
contrary. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO MAT-
TER HOW GREAT THE BENEFIT TO BE DERIVED OR 
THE DETRIMENT TO BE SUFFERED BY THE CHURCH 
IN THIS TRANSACTION NEITHER WOULD REDOUND 
TO THE BENEFIT OR DETRIMENT OF THE COMMIS-
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SIONERS AS INDIVIDUALS, AND FURTHER FINDING 
THAT: THUS THE 'CONFLICT OF INTEREST" REASON 
FOR BIDDING CONTRACTS BETWEEN THE CITY 
AND OFFICIALS INTERESTED IN THE SUBJECTMAT-
TER DOES NOT EXIST HERE BECAUSE IT IS UNIFORM-
LY HELD THAT THE INTEREST REFERRED TO IN 
SUCH A STATUTE MEANS THAT THE OFFICIAL MUST 
HAVE A PERSONAL AND PECUNIARY INTEREST IN 
THE SUBJECTMATTER. 
In making the foregoing statement the Court apparently 
overlooked a number of authorities cited in Appellant's original 
Brief, among them Vol. 2, Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 
Sec. 773, page 1143, where it is said: 
"It is impossible to lay down any general rule 
defining the nature of the interest of a municipal officer 
which comes within the operation of these principals. 
Any direct or indirect interest in the subjectmatter is 
sufficient to taint the contract with illegality if the 
interest be such as to offset the judgment and conduct 
of the officers in the making of the contract or in its 
performance." 
In the case of Miller v. City of Martinez, et al., 28 Cal. 
App. (2d) 364, 83 Pac. (2nd) 519, it is said that the interest 
of the public officer need not be financial, but may be any 
interest which would tend to prevent him from exercising 
absolute loyalty and undivided allegiance to the best interests 
of the city. To the same effect is Clark v. Utah Construction Co., 
51 Idaho 867, 8 Pac. (2d) 454. We have discussed this phase 
of the case at some length under Point Four, pages 31 to 42 
of our original Brief, and no useful purpose will be served by 
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repeating what is there said. However, as we read the authori-
ties cited in footnote 4 on page 4 of the opinion of the Court 
the same do not support what is claimed for them. 
Thus, it is said in Sec. 29.97, page 390 of the 3rd Ed. of 
McQuillin Municipal Corporations that municipal officers and 
agents are held by the courts to a strict accountability in their 
dealings with one on behalf of the corportion. In 63 C.J.S., 
Mun. Corp., Sec. 991(b), it is said, and numerous cases are 
cited, that wherein a municipality is brought into contractual 
relations with firms or companies or which councilman or other 
city officer was a member, stockholders or employee, the courts 
have usually applied the general doctrine to the undoing of 
such contracts just as though the officers were individually 
interested. If the beneficiaries of a trust fund are not interested 
in the same, it may be inquired, who are interested? They are 
the ones who own the fund. The only interest that the trustees, 
as such, have in the fund is to carry out its provisions. On page 
3 of the opinion, the Court directs attention to a provision 
of the Articles of Incorporation of the Corporation of The 
President as recited in the Brief of the Corporation to the 
effect that the Corporation may grant, sell, rent, mortgage, 
exchange or otherwise dispose of any part or all of said prop-
erty. While such provisions are probably not properly before 
the Court, the disposal of the assets of the Corporation by its 
trustee is not inconsistent with the ownership by the bene-
ficiaries. If any proceeds are derived from the grant, sale, rent, 
mortgage, exchange or other disposition of the property, such 
proceeds continue to belong to the beneficiaries. 
It is true that some of the adjudicated cases where con-
tracts with a city have been declared invalid involve matters 
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wherein one or more officers or agents of a city have a direct 
pecuniary interest. Many statutes so provide. However, to 
limit the disqualification to monetary interests would be to 
ignore the very essence of the evils sought to be prevented. 
The authorities are all agreed that the purpose of the law is 
to prevent a public officer from putting himself in a position 
which will subject him to the temptation of acting in any 
manner other than in the best interests of the public. The 
authorities are cited on pages 32 to 42 of our original Brief. 
In our original Brief under Point Seven, pages 45 to 49, 
we have discussed the monetary interest that the members of 
the Mormon Church have in the trust fund held by the Cor-
poration of the President and Zions Securities Corporation, 
defendants. Probably no useful purpose will be served by an 
attempt to enlarge upon what is there said. If effect be given 
to prevent the evils sought to be avoided by the provisions, 
such laws as U.C.A. 1953, 10-6-38, it is necessary that the act 
be applied to matters that are not monetary. It has frequently 
been said that the people of Utah, especially those who are 
members of the dominant Church, are a peculiar people. If 
it be meant by such expression that the belief in the infallibility 
of their leaders and their duty to comply with their desires is 
inquired into, there can be no doubt that the members of the 
L.D.S. Church are unique. 
It is alleged in paragraph 21(b) that one of the cardinal 
principles of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
is that its members shall comply with the announced desires of 
the leaders of that Church, and particularly such desires of its 
President and his Counselors. 
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'That when it was conceived that the property owned 
by defendant City might be acquired for the purpose 
of having erected thereon a Federal Building, defendant 
Gus P. Backman, a member of said Church, was called 
upon by the leaders of said Church to aid in under-
taking to acquire the above mentioned city property, 
and to get the consent of the proper officers of the 
United States to consent to accept the same as a site 
for a Federal Building. That when it became known 
that the Corporation of the President of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the leaders 
of said Church desired to purchase the above men-
tioned city property as a site for a Federal Building, 
the defendant City Commissioners proceeded to have 
the property appraised," etc. 
This Court will doubtless take judicial notice of the fact that 
the President of the L.D.S. Church, who is also the Corporation 
of the President, is the Prophet, Seer and Revelator of that 
Church, and as such is the representative of God on this earth. 
If the Court may not take judicial notice of such fact, plaintiff 
is entitled to show that to be the fact under the pleadings 
above quoted. Under such allegations, plaintiff is entitled to 
show and will show that at each semi-annual Conference of 
the members of the L.D.S. Church it is, in effect, proposed 
by the person presiding at such Conference that whoever is 
then President of the Church be sustained as the prophet, seer, 
revelator and trustee in trust of said Church, and that "those 
who are in favor of so doing signify it by raising your hand, 
and that when you do vote affirmatively, that you covenant 
to sustain the person so voted for/' 
Under the pleading above mentioned plaintiff is entitled 
to show and will show that it is the established doctrine of said 
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Church that its members are morally obligated to comply with 
the announced desires of the Church in both spiritual matters 
as well as temporal matters in which the Church may have an 
interest. That being so, the members of a City Council who 
are members of the L.,D.S. Church are clearly placed in the 
position which subjects them to conflicting duties, and exposes 
them to the temptation of acting in a manner other than in the 
best interest of the public. Indeed, the allegiance of one to 
his Church far transcends any monetary interest that one may 
have in a transaction. 
POINT EIGHT 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT "TO 
ASSUME THAT THEY (the Commissioners) WOULD BE 
TRAY THEIR PUBLIC TRUST AND SUBVERT THE 
INTERESTS OF THE CITY TO THOSE OF THE CHURCH 
WOULD REQUIRE THE CONJECTURE THAT THEY 
ARE BENT ON WRONGDOING AND VIOLATING 
THEIR OATH OF OFFICE. SUCH CONJECTURE THE 
LAW WILL NOT INDULGE, BUT IN THE ABSENCE 
OF A SPECIFIC CHARGE TO THE CONTRARY, RIGHT 
CONDUCT IS ALWAYS PRESUMED." 
If we look at the other side of the situation, it may be 
said with even greater force that: 
"To assume that they (the Commissioners) would 
betray their covenant with and duty to their Church and 
subvert the interests of the Church to those of the 
City, would require the conjecture that they are bent 
on turning their backs on their Church and violating 
their covenant with the Church and endangering their 
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standing with their Church and their rewards in the 
hereafter; that they ignore the doctrine of their Church 
which in effect teaches .that the Will of their President 
is the Will of God. 
Such conjecture the law will not indulge. The purpose of the 
law is to prevent public officers who are placed in a position 
such as that of the defendant Commissioners who are members 
of the L.D.S. Church from participating in a contract involving 
the sale of the city property to the Church. That the Church 
had an interest in the deal is evident because it is, according 
to the allegation of the Complaint, expending several hundred 
thousand dollars toward the purchase of the site. Moreover, 
it is very strange that the Church should participate in a trans-
action by a series of circuitous transactions in an attempt to 
get the title to the site in the United States. The orderly 
procedure would be to have the City contract with and convey 
the property directly to the United States. 
POINT NINE 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CON-
FLICT OF INTEREST REASON FOR FORBIDDING CON-
TRACTS BETWEEN THE CITY AND OFFICIALS IN-
TERESTED IN THE SUBJECTMATTER DOES NOT EX-
IST HERE BECAUSE IT IS UNIFORMLY HELD THAT 
THE INTEREST REFERRED TO IN SUCH STATEMENT 
MEANS THAT THE OFFICERS MUST HAVE A PER-
SONAL PECUNIARY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT MAT-
TER. 
What we have said under Points 7 and 8 have a bearing 
on this Point, and we adopt the same in support hereof without 
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repeating what is there said. We, however, direct the attention 
of the Court to the fact that our statute, unlike many others, 
makes no reference to either personal or monetary interests. 
To say that the statute means personal financial interests is to 
read in the statute a meaning that is not there. The words 
directly or indirectly interested expressly excludes the thought 
that the officer must have a direct personal interest. If the 
legislature had intended the interest to be monetary interest 
only, it would have so provided. Whether the allegations of 
the Complaint above mentioned and the evidence which 
plaintiff intended to introduce in support thereof be viewed 
in light of the provision of our statute or the common law, 
a member of the City Council, who is also a member of the 
L.D.S. Church and as such believes that the President of his 
Church is the emissary of God on this earth, cannot reasonably 
escape the conclusion that his obligation to his Church requires 
that he comply with the wishes of his President. To hold 
otherwise would be to emasculate the provisions of Section 
10-6-38, U.C.A. 1953, as applied to the pleaded facts in this 
case. 
POINT TEN 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
APPLICATION OF THE EXTENSION OF THE RULE 
AGAINST CONFLICT OF INTEREST APPLIED TO THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES HERE SHOWN WOULD GO FAR BE-
YOND THE EVILS AGAINST WHICH IT IS DIRECTED 
AND WOULD LIKELY CREATE EVILS OF ITS OWN. 
As heretofore argued under Point Nine, it is not an exten-
sion of the rule against interests to give effect to the allegations 
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of the Complaint and the evidence which plaintiff intends to 
offer in support thereof. It is the function of the court to 
construe the law.as passed by the legislative branch of gov-
ernment, and not to detremine whether or not it is a good law. 
Moreover, if there are evils which may arise by preventing 
public officers from participating in making contracts with 
the President of their Church to whom such officers own alle-
giance because he is the Prophet, Seer and Reveiator, and the 
representative of God on this earth, such evil is an incident 
to our democratic system of government, and may not be 
discarded because compliance with the will of the President 
of the Church may bring about better results. 
POINT ELEVEN 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT MEM-
BERSHIP IN THE CHURCH UNDER THE CIRCUM-
STANCES PRESENTED HERE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN 
AND AS BEING PROHIBITED BY SECTION 10-6-34, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
We have heretofore discussed this phase of the case, and 
shall not repeat what has been said, except to observe that 
it is alleged in pargraph 21, Sec. (a) "That the defendant 
commissioners seek to realize some benefits from such trans-
actions." (The sale of the property). Such allegations must 
be taken as true. Plaintiff has a right to try this case on his 
theory. 
POINT TWELVE 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRO-
VISION OF SECTION 10-8-8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
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1953, DOES NOT APPLY TO A SALE OF THE PROPERTY 
HERE INVOLVED. 
In the opinion of the Court it is said Section 10-8-8, U.C.A. 
1953, does not apply to the property at First South and State 
Streets because it names streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, 
sidewalks, airports and public grounds. It is held that the doc-
trine of ejustem geneus excludes the city property here involved 
because it is not of the same kind as the eunmerated prop 
erties. The mentioned properties are all real estate. It would 
seem that there is a greater reason for formal binding steps 
to be taken in the sale of property used to house city officers 
engaged in the performance of governmental functions than in 
securing the vacating of the enumerated public properties. 
There are numerous cases dealing with when the above men-
tioned doctrine should be applied, but to review the same 
would extend this Brief beyond reasonable limits. In our view 
the procedure followed by the City in its attempt to dispose 
of the property at First South and State Streets is fatally 
defective for reasons other than the failure to pass an ordi-
nance. Before taking up a discussion of such other reasons 
we direct the Court to the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 10-7-2, 
which provides that if the manner of exercising the power of 
the City Commission is not specifically pointed out, the Com-
mission "may provide by ordinance the manner and details" 
necessary for the full exercise of such power. In this case the 
City did not by Ordinance or at all specifically point out the 
manner and details necessary for the full exercise of the power 
to sell the property at First South and State Streets. Even if 
the power to sell the city property at First South and State 
Streets may be exercised by the passage of a Resolution, such 
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Resolution must meet the requirements enumerated by Mc-
Quillin on Municipal Corporations, Vol 2, page 672, which 
we have set out on page 26 of our original Brief. Among such 
requirements are that: 
"It must be precise, definite and certain in expression. 
It must be enacted in good faith, in the public interest 
alone and designated to enable the corporation to per-
form its true functions as a local government organ/' 
POINT THIRTEEN 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE 
IS NO ALLEGATION THAT THERE WAS ANY IMPRO-
PRIETY IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE CITY PROP-
ERTY WAS SOLD. 
Plaintiff has in substance alleged in paragraph 21 of his 
Complaint that the property at First South and State Streets 
is being used to house the employees ofthe City who are en-
gaged in the performance of governmental functions, and 
that no provision has been made for providing other places 
for such employees. The purported bid made by the Chamber 
of Commerce is set out in paragraph 13 of plaintiff's Complaint. 
In its Motion for Leave to File an Amendment to the Com-
plaint plaintiff alleged that there was no lawful publication 
of notice to sell the property. No lawful bid was made for the 
property; that the purported bid did not comply with the 
Notice; that there was no lawful acceptance of the purported 
bid, etc. Obviously, these allegations show that there were 
subterfuges and impropriety in the manner in which the City 
is attempting to dispose of its property at First South and State 
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Streets, and that plaintiff should be permitted to produce his 
evidence in support of his allegations. 
These allegations if and when established by the evidence 
will entitle plaintiff to prevail, and the Court is in error in 
assuming that these allegations are not true. 
CONCLUSION 
In the foregoing Petition for a Rehearing and the Brief 
in support thereof we have called the attention of the Court 
to allegations in the Complaint which we believe may be readily 
established by competent evidence, and to the law applicable 
to facts alleged in the Complaint. The Court has apparently 
either misconceived the purport of the pleaded facts, or con-
cluded that the same are insufficient to entitle plaintiff to any 
relief. We have carefully read the authorities cited by the 
Court and believe that if the Court will re-examine such law 
in the light of the pleaded facts, the Court will be forced to 
come to a different conclusion. 
We are filing this Petition and Brief not only in our effort 
to seek a different decision in this case, but with the thought in 
mind that if some of the conclusions reached in this case are 
permitted to become the established law in this jurisdiction, 
they may well result in permitting public property and trust 
funds to be dissipated without any means to prevent such 
unfortunate results. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN 
BURTON W. MUSSER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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